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INTRODUCTION
Smoking-related diseases cost the U.S. health care system
approximately $24 billion annually.' Including productivity losses,
the cost of smoking is $52 billion per year, or $221 for every man,
woman, and child in the United States.2 Many of these costs are
inevitably borne by America's businesses, which are paying in-
creasingly more for health care, with little left over for expansion
and modernization. In response to concerns about rising insurance
costs, employee safety, and growing demands by nonsmokers for a
smoke-free workplace, many employers are adopting policies that
restrict or prohibit smoking on the job, and a growing number are
taking the additional step of refusing to hire smokers at all.
Smokers who face discrimination may attempt to find refuge
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA).4 To be covered under the ADA's employment discrimi-
nation provisions, a smoker would have to show that he is addict-
1. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: A NATIONAL STATUS REPORT 40 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
SMOKING AND HEALTH]; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SMOKING-RE-
LATED DEATHS AND FINANCIAL COSTS 4-5 (1985) [hereinafter SMOKING-RELATED
COSTS] (estimating that the total cost of smoking is approximately $65 billion per year
but noting that the yearly costs could be as high as $95 billion or as low as $38 billion).
2. SMOKING AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 40. The Office of Technology Assess-
ment estimated that the cost was $2.17 for every pack of cigarettes sold. See SMOKING-
RELATED COSTS, supra note 1, at 4-5.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
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ed to nicotine and that this addiction qualifies as a disability that
merits protection from employment discrimination.
Nicotine addiction is noticeably missing from the ADA's
illustrative list of covered disabilities.' To qualify as disabled un-
der the Act, smokers would have to show that their addiction fits
within the statutory definition of a disability, which would entail
proving either that their addiction to nicotine substantially impairs
a "major life activity" or that it is "regarded as" impairing a ma-
jor life activity.' Another approach might be to argue that addic-
tion to nicotine is sufficiently similar to alcoholism or drug addic-
tion to merit inclusion by analogy.7
This Note explores the ADA's definition of disability to de-
termine whether people who are addicted to nicotine should be
considered disabled for the purposes of the Act. Part I discusses
the problems that motivate employers to discriminate against
smokers. Part II provides a brief overview of Title I of the ADA
and then examines whether nicotine addiction falls under the
ADA's definition of disability. This Note argues that, although
excluding smokers from the workforce may not be the best solu-
tion to the problems of smoking in the workplace, addiction to
nicotine should not qualify as a covered disability and concludes
that nonsmoking hiring policies are not prohibited under the
ADA.
I. RATIONALES FOR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SMOKERS
A growing number of- employers are taking measures to con-
trol or eliminate smoking in the workplace; some have even decid-
ed not to hire smokers at all. A 1985 survey conducted by the
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) and the American Society for
Personnel Administration found that, of the 662 employers re-
sponding, more than one-third had restrictive smoking policies in
effect, 2% were currently developing them, and another 21% were
considering them.' Fifteen percent of the companies surveyed
5. Congress specifically included conditions such as multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy,
mental retardation, learning disabilities, HIV infection, drug addiction, and even alcohol-
ism in the ADA's coverage. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 333.
6. See id. at 335; see also infra notes 104-30 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 131-36.
8. See Zachary Schiller et al., If You Light Up on Sunday, Don't Come in on Mon-
day, BUS. WK., Aug. 26, 1991, at 68.
9. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
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either allowed or mandated preferences for nonsmoking job appli-
cants, and 2% refused to hire smokers at all.'0 In 1991, BNA
updated its survey and found that the number of companies with
restrictive policies had grown to 85%." Most of the responding
companies reported that they had not experienced major enforce-
ment problems, and 69% said that the policies had improved
nonsmokers' morale.'2
The conflict between interest groups who support smokers'
rights and those who promote protection for nonsmokers has
proved to be a bitter one. Powerful organizations such as the
Tobacco Institute, the American Lung Association, and the Ameri-
can Cancer Society 3 have developed extensive public relations
campaigns to convince employers to adopt smoking policies of one
sort or another. 4
A. The Costs of Smoking to Employers
An employee who smokes is significantly more expensive to
have on the payroll than a nonsmoking employee.' Smokers
cause employers to incur extra expenses through higher absentee-
CONCERNING SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE 12 (1986) [hereinafter WHERE THERE'S
SMOKE].
10. Id.; see also Nancy R. Brooks, Some Employers are Saying: 'Smokers Need Not
Apply,' L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1993, at D3 (listing several companies that refuse to hire
smokers, including Atlanta-based Turner Broadcasting System, which has not hired smok-
ers since 1986, and Health Net, California's second-largest health maintenance organiza-
tion).
11. Bureau of National Affairs, Bulletin to Management, BNA POL'Y & PRAC. SE-
RIES, Aug. 29, 1991, at 2.
12. Id. at 8-9.
13. Smaller groups such as the Coalition on Smoking and Health, Americans for
Nonsmokers' Rights, and Action on Smoking and Health also have formed to encourage
businesses and legislatures to adopt smoking controls. See generally Ronald E. Roel, No
Smoking in the City, NEWSDAY, Apr. 4, 1988, at 1 (describing small businesses' efforts to
comply with New York's no smoking ordinance).
14. For instance, the Tobacco Institute urges firms to adopt policies that accommo-
date smokers, rather than ones that impose total bans on smoking. See, e.g., TOBACCO
INSTITUTE, SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE: SOME CONSIDERATIONS (pamphlet, on file
with author); R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr. & Dennis H. Vaughan, Smoking in the Workplace:
A Management Perspective, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 383 (1986) (authored by two partners
at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker for the Tobacco Institute); see also Alix M. Freed-
man & Laurie P. Cohen, Smoke and Mirrors: How Cigarette Makers Keep Health Ques-
lion 'Open' Year After Year. WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1993, at 1, 6.
15. Total cost estimates range from $336 to $4600 per smoker per year. See MARION
MERELL Dow, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE 9 (1991)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPACT]; see also WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 7.
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1761ism;" higher health, 7 fire," and life insurance costs;19 and
productivity losses due to poor employee morale and the time
consumed by "smoking rituals."'2 Employees who smoke have
twice as many on-the-job accidents as nonsmokers.21 Property
losses due to damage, depreciation, and increased maintenance
16. By one estimate, "smokers are absent from work 50 percent more often than
nonsmokers, have twice as many on-the-job accidents, and are 50 percent more likely to
be hospitalized than workers who do not smoke." NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE &
SMOKING POLICY INSTITUTE, Costs and Benefits of Smoking Restrictions in the Workplace,
[hereinafter Costs and Benefits] in SMOKING POLICY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, NO. 4
[hereinafter SMOKING POLICY] (interview with William Weiss, Albers School of Business,
Seattle University). Another study estimated that the excess absenteeism of smokers cost
$330 extra per smoker per year. See ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 15, at 4.
17. One group estimated that smokers submit $300 more per year in health insur-
ance claims than do nonsmokers and that heavy smokers are more likely to submit
claims for more than $5000. See ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 15, at 5-6. Recognizing
that smoke-free companies may be healthier, many insurers offer them reduced premiums.
For example, some fire and casualty companies cut premiums for such companies' em-
ployees by 50%. New York Life reduces annual premiums on commercial disability poli-
cies by $150 per nonsmoking employee, and Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Minnesota offers
a 22% discount on premiums for insured nonsmokers. Costs and Benefits, supra note 16.
Some employers have reacted to this discrepancy by charging smokers extra money for
health insurance. For instance, in January 1992, Texas Instruments began charging insured
employees $10 per month for each family member who uses tobacco. See Smoking Brings
Higher Health Premiums at TI, STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 9, 1992, at D2; see also WHERE
THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing one insurance company that banned all
smoking on the premises and required all smoking employees to pay $25 per month
toward health insurance costs).
18. One study estimated the cost of smoking-related fires to be $340 million per year
in 1986 dollars. See WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HAB-
ITS 76 (1991) (citing Bryan R. Luce & Stuart 0. Schweitzer, Smoking and Alcohol
Abuse: A Comparison of Their Economic Consequences, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 569
(1978)). Another group calculated that each employee who smokes costs his employer
annually $45 in extra accidental injury and workers' compensation costs, $45 in fire, life,
and wage continuation policies, and $5 to $10 in fire losses. See ECONOMIC IMPACT,
supra note 15, at 7.
19. See Marvin M. Kristein, How Much Can Business Expect to Profit from Smoking
Cessation?, 12 PREVENTIVE MED. 358, 365 (1983)'(finding that life insurance premiums
cost an employer an additional $20 to $33 per year for each smoker on the payroll),
Another study found that smokers have lower retirement and disability costs due to
reductions in life expectancy. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 18, at 12.
20. Smoking rituals include lighting a cigarette, smoking, and flicking ashes and can
result in lost working time. Some studies estimate that from 8 to 33 minutes of work
time is lost per worker per day, or 18.2 days and $1820 per year lost for each smoking
employee (in 1981, dollars). See ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 15, at 9. But see Alfred
Vogel, Are Smokers Really Less Productive than Nonsmokers?, LEGIS. POL'Y, Summer
1985, at 6, 6-7 (reporting that the results of a survey of "approximately 1750 first level
managers and supervisors" indicated that smoking on breaks does not significantly affect
productivity and that occasional smoking while working has little effect on productivity).
21. See ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 15, at 7.
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costs also are exacerbated by employees who smoke.' Smokers
may be more listless and inattentive than other workers due to
oxygen deprivation, which can affect both productivity and the
quality of an employee's work.
Workplace smoking has become a sensitive issue with employ-
ees and has resulted in a growing number of conflicts between
smokers and nonsmokers,' some of which have ended in costly
litigation.24 Polls show that a large majority of the American peo-
ple favors some regulation of smoking in the workplace.' Al-
though many of the costs associated with smoking in the
workplace may be relieved by restrictive smoking policies, others,
such as increased health care and absenteeism costs, can be con-
trolled only by eliminating smokers from the workforce complete-
ly.
The direct cost of smoking is not the only motivation for
employers to refuse to hire smokers. Companies often formulate
smoking policies in response to employee complaints about smok-
ing26 and to avoid potential liability for illnesses caused by envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke (ETS).'7 Some occupations expose
workers to hazardous airborne substances such as asbestos, coal
dust, or cotton dust. Cigarette smoke acts synergistically with
many of these substances to exacerbate their harmful effects.28
For instance, smokers who work with asbestos are fifty times more
likely to develop lung cancer than asbestos workers who do not
22. A survey of 2000 companies that had adopted no smoking policies found that
60% reported significant reductions in cleaning and maintenance costs. Id. at 8.
23. See, e.g., WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 27; Mark A. Rothstein, Re-
fitsing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 940, 953 (1987); David B. Ezra, Note, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-
Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1990).
24. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hennly, 434 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). In Richard-
son, a former employee filed suit against a savings and loan association and a co-employ-
ee, alleging battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress after the co-employee
"intentionally smoked around [the plaintiff] to afinoy her." Id. at 774. The court held
that intentionally directing pipe smoke at another could indeed constitute battery. Id. at
775.
25. A 1985 Gallup poll found that 88% of all respondents, including 80% of smok-
ers, said that some policy should be in force. Eighty percent said that smoking should be
restricted to certain areas, and 76% of smokers agreed. Few of those polled, however,
supported a total ban on smoking in the workplace. See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra
note 9, at 8.
26. See id. at 13.
27. See infra notes 37-57 and accompanying text.
28. See Rothstein, supra note 23, at 951.
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smoke.29 This differential increases to ninety times with asbestos
workers who smoke more than a pack of cigarettes daily.30 A
heavily exposed asbestos worker who also smokes more than a
pack per day has a 5000% greater risk of developing lung cancer
than a person who neither smokes nor works with asbestos. 31 Sig-
nificantly, even smoking outside of work is likely to produce these
synergistic effects. Thus, industries where employees are exposed
to these kinds of risks there is a particularly strong motive for
hiring only nonsmokers.
Some states provide by statute that firefighters who have
heart attacks or develop lung cancer or pulmonary diseases are
generally entitled to workers' compensation when there is a job-
related cause-even if the condition would not have developed but
for the employee's smoking.32 Smoke inhalation is significantly
more hazardous to smokers than to nonsmokers.33 The risk of
liability has prompted many fire departments to adopt nonsmoking
policies for employees both on and off the job.
A fire department in Oklahoma City adopted such a policy in
an effort to maintain a healthy workforce and reduce workers'
compensation costs. A firefighter trainee who was dismissed for
smoking on his lunch break challenged the policy. In Grusendorf
v. City of Oklahoma City,3' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the nonsmoking rule did not violate due
process because, although the off-duty smoking ban may have
infringed Grusendorf's liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment, it had a rational relationship to the legitimate state
purpose of promoting the health and safety of the employees.35
Although no reported cases have examined the issue, it seems
likely that, in light of the Environmental Protection Agency's
29. Id.; see also Smokihg and the Bhte-Collar Work Force, in SMOKING POLICY,
supra note 16, No. 10 (interview with Donald Shopland, representative of the Smoking,
Tobacco, and Cancer Program's National Cancer Institute).
30. SMOKING POLICY, supra note 16, No. 10.
31. Id.
32. See Rothstein, supra note 23, at 952 (discussing the statutory creation by over
half the states of an irrebuttable presumption that cardiovascular or respiratory impair-
ment suffered by a firefighter is work-related); see also infra notes 70-72 and accompany-
ing text.
33. Id. at 952-53.
34. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 543.
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(EPA) report on the dangers of ETS,36 courts could extend this
reasoning to uphold other smoking policies that are rationally
related to promoting the health and safety of employees.
B. Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Clear evidence shows that ETS, also known as passive or
involuntary smoking, presents a significant health risk to nonsmok-
ers.37 In January 1993, the EPA released a massive study that
branded secondary tobacco smoke a class A human carcinogen
that causes 20% of all lung cancers in the United States. 8 In
1986, then-U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop issued a report
on ETS that concluded, inter alia, that involuntary smoking causes
diseases, including lung cancer, in healthy nonsmokers and that
because of constant air circulation, the simple separation of smok-
ers and nonsmokers within the same airspace may reduce, but
does not eliminate, nonsmokers' exposure to ETS, even when
filtering devices are used.39 One scientist has even asserted that
inhaling ETS may be a greater risk of cancer for the general pop-
ulation than all other agents in the environment." To date, the
36. See infra Section I(B).
37. According to the American Lung Association, tobacco smoke contains about 4000
chemicals, including 200 known poisons such as DDT, arsenic, formaldehyde, and carbon
monoxide. Sidestream smoke, which goes directly into the air from the burning tobacco
and is inhaled by nonsmokers, actually has higher concentrations of some harmful com-
pounds than the mainstream smoke inhaled by the smoker. Studies show that sidestream
smoke contains twice as much tar and nicotine and three times as much carbon monox-
ide. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, FACTS ABOUT SECONDHAND SMOKE 2 (1988); see
also NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1990); Emmet W. Lee &
Gilbert E. D'Alonzo, Cigarette Smoking, N'icotine Addiction, and its Pharmacologic Treat-
ment, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 34, 35 (1993) (finding that the risk of lung cancer
from passive smoking is more than 100 times greater than the estimated effect of 20
years' exposure to asbestos while living or working in an asbestos-contaminated building).
But see WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 5-6 (noting that the tobacco industry
disputes many of these findings).
38. OFFICE OF RES. & DEv., U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY
HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING 2-2 (1992) (finding that the risks associated with
ETS are a substantial public health concern); see also Rudy Abramson, EPA Officially
Links Passive Smoke, Cancer, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at A26; EPA Attributes 3,000
Non-Smoker Lung Cancer Deaths Annually to Secondhand Smoke, HEALTH NEWS DAILY,
Jan. 8, 1993, at 4.
39. See REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 7 (1986); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MAJOR LOCAL SMOKING ORDINANCES IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1989) [hereinafter LOCAL ORDINANCES].
40. See The Health Effects of Environmental Tobacco Smoke, in SMOKING POLICY,
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has shied
away from regulating secondhand tobacco smoke, but has already
received more than 1200 comments and studies on the ETS prob-
lem since it issued a request for information on indoor air issues
in 1991.41 It is expected to issue an advance notice of expected
rulemaking on ETS in 1994.42
Public awareness of the serious health threat ETS poses will
likely initiate much more righteous indignation-and litiga-
tion-aimed at smokers. One interesting, and perhaps illustrative,
incident occurred in May 1993 in a Baltimore County restaurant.
Deborah Jane Lowenstein was sitting in the smoking section, exer-
cising her right to smoke, when another patron asked her to put
out her cigarette. The ensuing argument culminated with one man
(a 47-year-old lawyer) allegedly "smacking her on the forehead
like an old-time faith healer and saying, 'Heal! Heal!' while anoth-
er was tying her belt loops to the chair.' '43 Lowenstein filed bat-
tery charges against both men. Her attorney, Craig M. Kadish,
likened the incident to "the resurgence of Nazism in Europe and
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia." 44
Potential legal liability provides employers with another strong
incentive to eliminate ETS from the workplace. Some courts have
held that employers have a common law duty to provide a smoke-
free working environment for the comfort and safety of non-
smoking employees.4 ' The first case of this kind was Shimp v.
supra note 16, No. 1 (quoting David M. Burns, M.D., senior scientific editor of the 1986
Surgeon General's report, based on estimates by the National Academy of Sciences and
the EPA); see also Kyle Steenland, Passive Smoking and the Risk of Heart Disease, 267
JAMA 94, 99 (1992) (concluding that ETS is responsible for 35,000 to 40,000 heart dis-
ease deaths among current nonsmokers annually and that the lifetime heart disease risk
from ETS is far greater than that used to determine environmental limits for other tox-
ins).
41. Special Report: OSHA '94: Seeking Redefined Mission, Revitalization of Existing
Authorities, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 963, 972-73 (Jan. 12, 1994).
42. Id. But see Harvey M." Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control of Ciga-
rette Smoking in the United States, 5 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 277 (1980) (noting that
any government control of tobacco would face serious political obstacles).
43. Fern Shen, Maryland Woman Alleges Attack for Smoking in Restaurant, WASH.
POST, May 22, 1993, at DI.
44. L
45. See, e.g., Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(finding allegations of workplace exposure to tobacco smoke sufficient to state a claim
for breach of employer's common law duty to provide a safe workplace); McCarthy v.
Department of Social & Health Servs., 759 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1988) (holding that an em-
ployee stated a common law tort claim when she alleged that her employer negligently
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New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.,46 decided in 1976. The court held
that a secretary who was sensitive to cigarette smoke had a com-
mon law right to a safe working environment and was entitled to
an injunction forcing her employer to restrict smoking in her work
area.47 Cases such as this should be much easier to win today in
light of the voluminous new scientific evidence documenting the
dangers of ETS to all employees."
Courts also have held that employees who are allergic or
hypersensitive to tobacco smoke are "handicapped" under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 9 For instance, in Vickers v. Veterans
Administration,"0 the court held (1) that an employee who
worked in a smoke-filled environment and was unusually sensitive
to tobacco smoke qualified for protection because he was limited
in his capacity to work; and (2) that working constituted a "major
life activit[y]."'' This decision may prompt more employers to
eliminate smoking from the workplace to avoid potential tort
liability and increased disability52 and unemployment insurance53
claims.
required her to work in a smoke-filled office, which resulted in her contracting a chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease). But see Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, Inc., 462 A.2d
10, 15 (D.C. 1983) (holding that an employer did not have a common law duty to pro-
vide a smoke-free environment for an employee who was particularly sensitive to ciga-
rette smoke and who refused to work in an area occupied by smokers).
46. 368 A.2d 408 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
47. Id. at 409-10, 416.
48. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 793-794 (1988); see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in interpreting the ADA).
50. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
51. Id. at 87; see also County of Fresno v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 277
Cal . Rptr. 557 (1991) (holding that employees who are hypersensitive to tobacco smoke
due to respiratory illnesses are handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act). But see GASP
v. Mecklenburg County, 256 S.E.2d 477 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim
that their sensitivity to smoking constituted a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act); cf.
Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that
the plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the ADA because he failed to establish
that the employer's accommodations were insufficient and because positive evaluations
proved he was still able to perform the essential functions of his job adequately, despite
his sensitivity to cigarette smoke).
52. See, e.g., Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 702 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a federal employee who was hypersensitive to cigarette smoke established a
prima facie case for entitlement to disability benefits by showing inability to continue
working).
53. See, e.g., McCrocklin v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App.
1984) (stating that an employee had good cause for leaving his job because of a reason-
able fear of harm to his health and safety from the work environment).
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Owners of bars and restaurants could be particularly vulnera-
ble to lawsuits in light of a recent study published in the Journal
of the American Medical Association. The study found that the
level of secondhand smoke in restaurants is up to two times high-
er than that found in offices and 1.5 times higher than that found
in homes with at least one smoker. Bars are even worse, contain-
ing levels of ETS up to 6.1 times higher than in offices and 4.5
times higher than in homes with at least one smoker. The study
concluded, based on these figures, that restaurant workers may
face a 50% higher risk of contracting lung cancer than the general
population.54
Banning smoking from some work areas or segregating smok-
ers and nonsmokers will not completely solve the ETS problem,
however. To eliminate ETS pollution from the workplace entirely,
smoking areas must have separate ventilation and circulation sys-
tems; otherwise, toxins will be constantly recirculated throughout
the building.'5 Expensive filters can eliminate only some of the
harmful particles from the air, leaving the gases that contain most
of the irritants. In most cases, companies find it financially pro-
hibitive to install new ventilation systems in individual offices or in
smoking areas within the building. 7
Failing to provide smoking facilities at all, however, will exac-
erbate productivity losses caused by employees who smoke. Smok-
ers take frequent breaks; requiring them to travel outside the
building or to a separate building can further increase time lost. 8
Clearly, maintaining a smoke-free workplace is burdensome, partic-
ularly for small companies with few financial resources. Instituting
nonsmoking hiring policies, and thereby gradually eliminating
smokers from the workforce, is understandably seen as an attrac-
tive alternative that can decrease productivity losses.
54. Michael Siegel, Involuntary Smoking in the Restaurant Workplace, 270 JAMA 490
(1993).
55. See Smoking in the Workplace: Ventilation, in SMOKING POLICY, supra note 16,
No. 5 (interview with James L. Repace, Physicist for the EPA's Indoor Air Program,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
56. Id.
57. The burden on larger corporations and companies that are building new facilities,
however, may not be great enough to qualify for the ADA's undue hardship defense. See
infra subsection II(C)(2).
58. See WHERE THERE's SMOKE, supra note 9, at 7 (citing one report that estimated
that employees who leave the worksite to smoke cost $309.5 million per year in produc-
tivity losses, or $867 per employee-assuming only two, 10-minute breaks a day).
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C. Local Legislative Responses
Some state legislatures have responded to the growing trend
of establishing hiring preferences for nonsmokers by passing laws
that prohibit employers from basing employment-related decisions
on workers' off-duty activities. 9 These statutes attempt to curb
so-called lifestyle discrimination. ° Without these prohibitions, it is
argued, businesses potentially could force employees to lose
weight, lower their blood pressure, or even refrain from hang
gliding.6' Although this argument may be persuasive with respect
to some intrusive restrictions, most smoking controls are directly
linked to the legitimate business needs of maintaining a productive
workforce and protecting the health of nonsmoking employees.
Laws that do not allow employers latitude in this basic realm of
business management can be detrimental to the competitiveness of
businesses.
Most of these legislative actions are hardly the result of a
spontaneous uprising to champion smokers' rights. Rather, they
have been initiated and actively backed by the Tobacco Insti-
tute.62 A few labor unions have supported the enactment of these
statutes,63 but most have been unwilling to take a definite stand
59. See Christine Woolsey, Off-Duty Conduct: None of Employer's Business, Bus.
INS., Feb. 17, 1992, at 10 (noting that such laws have passed in 21 states); see also Bar-
bara Franklin, Employees' Rights: New Law Protects "Legal Activities" of Workers, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 17, 1992, at 5 (discussing a New York law that makes it illegal for a company
to refuse to hire anyone based on "smok[ing], drink[ing], or engag[ing] in other legal
activities outside of work").
60. James Bone, Too Close for the Company, THE TIMES (LONDON), April 27, 1992,
at LT4. See generally Marvin Hill, Jr. & Emily Delacenserie, Procrustean Beds and Dra-
conian Choices: Lifestyle Regulations and Officious Intermeddlers-Bosses, Workers, Courts,
and Labor Arbitrators, 57 Mo. L. REV. 51 (1992) (discussing the legal treatment of
employers' attempts to regulate employees' lifestyles).
61. See Bone, supra note 60, at LT4 (noting that some companies have refused to
hire people who ride motorcycles or hang glide because of the potential impact these
activities have on employer-provided health insurance premiums); Dennis J. McGrath,
New Laws Give More Rights to Smokers, STAR TRIB., May 17, 1992, at Al (quoting
advocates for the Tobacco Institute and the American Civil Liberties Union); Paula Span,
Smokers' New Hazard: No Work, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1991, at Al (noting examples of
restrictions placed on employee lifestyle decisions by employers).
62. LOCAL ORDINANCES, supra note 39, at vi; McGrath, supra note 61, at Al; Janny
Scott, Tobacco Firms Mimic Grass-Roots Foes, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at
A3.
63. See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 25-29 (reporting that in 1986 the
AFL-CIO Executive Council opposed both employer-mandated and legislated smoking
restrictions).
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on the issue, fearing disputes between smoking and nonsmoking
members.6' All unions, however, strongly support restrictions that
are directly related to worker safety.65
The Tobacco Institute long has exhorted smokers to fight
local government intrusions into the right to smoke through grass-
roots smokers' rights movements.6 Such efforts have been only
marginally successful, perhaps in part because most smokers are
not particularly proud of their habit and would like to quit. A
1991 Gallup poll found that 76% of smokers would give up smok-
ing if they could.67
In contrast to laws that prohibit discrimination against smok-
ers, statutes in forty-four states protect nonsmokers, 68 and nearly
400 local ordinances have been enacted to this end.69 In addition,
many states have added "heart and lung" provisions to their
workers' compensation laws to protect employees exposed to
harmful smoke and gases on the job.7" These provisions generally
create an irrebuttable presumption that the causes of cardiovascu-
lar and respiratory diseases are work-related and thus must be
covered by workers' compensation. 71 In response to such legisla-
tion, some fire and police departments have imposed a ban on
hiring smokers in an effort to reduce potential workers' compensa-
tion and liability costs.72
64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. at 25. This statement might call into question union neutrality on the smoking
issue, particularly in light of recent revelations concerning the dangers of ETS to
nonsmoking employees. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing these
dangers).
66. See Paula Span, A New Hazard for Smokers, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13, 1991,
at 7.
67. This national telephone survey of 2014 adults asked the following question: "All
things. considered, would you like to give up smoking cigarettes, or not?" Seventy-six
percent said yes, 22% said no, and 2% had no opinion. ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC
OPINION RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CONN. (1991), available in WESTLAW, Poll database.
68. Nancy A. Rigotti & Chris L. Poshos, No-Smoking Laws in the United States, 266
JAMA 3162 (1991).
69. See LOCAL ORDINANCES, supra note 39, at vi. The local ordinances tend to be
more specific than state laws. For instance, 75% mandate that employers address the
issue of smoking in the workplace. These laws do not necessarily conflict with lifestyle
discrimination prohibitions.
70. See Rothstein, supra note 23, at 952-53 (referring to statutes that limit protection
to firefighters).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 10, at D3.
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II. TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT
The growing trend of hiring nonsmokers exclusively has
prompted some commentators to advocate refuge for smokers
under the sweeping provisions of the ADA.73 However, nicotine
addiction does not qualify under the statutory definition of dis-
ability because it neither substantially limits a major life activity
nor is generally regarded as doing so. Even if courts ultimately
determine that smokers are disabled under the ADA, some em-
ployers may still be able to justify discriminatory hiring practices
under the Act's defenses.
A. An Overview of the Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 199074 was enacted
to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring
those individuals into the economic and social mainstream of
American life."' Congress found that disabled people occupy a
decidedly disadvantaged position in society, both socially and eco-
nomically, and that this status is primarily the result of purposeful
discrimination, rather than an inevitable consequence of their
physical or mental limitations.76 The ADA is intended to bolster
the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,.' from which it
borrows much of its language. Commentators differ, however, as
73. See, e.g., Jimmy Goh, Note, "Smokers Need Not Apply". Challenging Employment
Discrimination Against Smokers Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 U. KAN. L.
REV. 817 (1991) (arguing that the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
smokers in hiring decisions); Christina Grasso, Note, Are Employers Who Refuse to Hire
Smokers Discriminating Within the Meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990?, 66 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1109 (1993) (concluding that an addicted smoker may be
considered disabled under the ADA but that it remains to be seen whether he will re-
ceive its benefits and protections).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
75. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
446.
76. Id. at 448.
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 793-794 (1988). For a more complete discussion of the rela-
tionship between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, see Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., His-
torical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387 (1991);
see also Jeffrey Higginbotham, The Americans with Disabilities Act, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 217, 219 n.12 (1991) (discussing the significance of the Rehabilitation Act in
interpreting the ADA).
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to how much weight courts should give legal precedent under the
Rehabilitation Act when interpreting the ADA.78
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified
disabled individuals with respect to any term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment.79 This title went into effect on July 26, 1992,
two years after the ADA was passed.' For the first two years,
the ADA regulated businesses employing twenty-five or more em-
ployees; in 1994, its scope extends automatically to companies with
fifteen or more employees."1
A key component of Title I is the term "qualified individual
with a disability,"'  which, according to the legislative history,
means someone with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of a desired
position.83 The objective of this language is to ensure that em-
ployment decisions are made based on qualifications that are unre-
lated to the existence or consequences of a disability.' Employ-
ers are given some latitude to determine the essential functions of
a job, but courts also consider evidence such as written job de-
scriptions and the amount of time spent on particular tasks.'
78. See, e.g., Weicker, supra note 77, at 387 (arguing that the Rehabilitation Act
should be used in interpreting the ADA); see also Jeffery 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barri-
ers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1991). Cooper as-
serts that
[a]lthough Congress clearly relied upon the regulations implemented under
the Rehabilitation Act in drafting the ADA, the ADA's statutory language and
extensive legislative history suggest that Congress intended to modify the Reha-
bilitation Act's approach to employment discrimination in subtle but significant
.ways .... [Courts must not apply Rehabilitation Act precedent to the ADA
uncritically, but instead must recognize the ways in which Congress's expressed
intent differs from the approach taken by the courts under section 501, and
especially section 504, of the Rehabilitation Act.
Id.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. III 1991).
80. See Americans with Disabilities Act § 108, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327,
337 (1990).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
82. Id. § 12112(a).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 337.
84. Id.
85. The EEOC's regulations, authorized under § 12116 of the ADA, provide an
extensive list of criteria to determine whether a particular function is essential:
(n) Essential Functions-(1) In general. The term essential functions means
the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a
disability holds or desires. The term "essential functions" does not include the
marginal functions of the position.
1102 [Vol. 43:1089
1994] NONSMOKING HIRING POLICIES 1103
The definition of disability in the ADA is critical to the dis-
cussion in this Note. Disability is defined as: "(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such im-
pairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 8 6
The ADA requires that employers make reasonable accom-
modations to the known limitations of employees with disabilities,
unless such accommodations would impose an undue financial
burden on the business.' Accommodations may include installing
ramps or elevators for better accessibility, allowing for job restruc-
turing or modified work schedules, or purchasing new equipment.
The required accommodations will vary based on the individual's
needs in each case.88
B. Nicotine Addiction and the ADA's Definition of Disability
In its initial consideration of the ADA, Congress stated that
some 43 million Americans have at least one physical or mental
disability. 9 Congress also found that people with disabilities, as a
group, occupy an inferior status in society and are severely disad-
vantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.9"
(2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons,
including but not limited to the following:
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is
to perform that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of em-
ployees available among whom the performance of that job function can be
distributed; and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the
position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular
function.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)-(2) (1993).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991). The second and third alternatives are
conditioned on having a "record of" or "being regarded as having" the type of impair-
ment that satisfies the first definition.' See Mark D. Laponsky, Defining "Disability". A
Look at the Term Within the Context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 44 (1992).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). For a more complete discussion of these terms, see
Margaret E. Stine, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 37 S.D. L. REv. 97 (1992).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 461-63.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
90. Id. § 12101(a)(2)-(3).
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Smokers, on the other hand, are not so disadvantaged. The
estimated 46.8 million Americans who currently smoke, as well as
the 43.4 million former smokers,91 occupy every socioeconomic
and educational level in America. Although the percentage of
smokers is slightly higher among the lower socioeconomic seg-
ments of society,' no experts contend that this statistic is due to
discrimination based solely on addiction to nicotine.93 Smokers
are neither severely disadvantaged nor discriminated against to
such an extent that the passage or application of federal legislation
to resolve their plight is appropriate.94
Unfortunately, Congress did not see fit to resolve this trouble-
some issue. Smoking is mentioned only once in the ADA.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude the prohi-
bition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places
of employment covered by subchapter I of this chapter, in trans-
portation covered by subchapter II or III of this chapter, or in
places of public accommodation covered by subchapter III of this
chapter.95
This provision is inconclusive as to whether the drafters intended
to include smoking as a covered disability in the ADA. The issue
was intentionally left ambiguous. This ambiguity is not surprising
given the delicate balance of interests that was required to pass
the legislation; an explicit inclusion or exclusion of smoking would
have mobilized several powerful special interest groups and might
have prevented the legislation's passage.
The legislative history of the ADA lists a variety of conditions
that qualify as physical or mental impairments. These include, inter
alia, cerebral palsy, cancer, HIV infection, learning disabilities,
drug addiction, and alcoholism.96 Physical characteristics, such as
91. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERvS., SMOKING AND
HEALTH 21 (1992).
92. See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 8.
93. Some have argued, however, that such a causal link could arise if the practice of
not hiring smokers became widespread. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 23, at 960. De-
spite this possibility, courts would be hard-pressed to find legislative history or sound
policy reasons supporting the treatment of smokers as a protected class. See infra text
accompanying notes 154-56.
94. In fact, a 1986 Robert Half poll of Fortune 1000 executives found that 22% of
vice presidents and personnel directors smoke and that 61% are former smokers. These
executives estimated that 14% of top managers, 19% of middle managers, and 24% of
personnel smoke. See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 9.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
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eye color, and environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages
are not included. 7 Although drug addiction is covered, the use of
illegal drugs is explicitly excluded.9 Nicotine is undoubtedly both
legal and addictive,99 but nicotine addiction does not therefore
automatically fit the ADA's definition of disability.
To qualify for coverage under the ADA's definition of disabil-
ity, a smoker would have to demonstrate that his habit goes be-
yond mere social smoking and amounts to a dependence on, or
addiction to, nicotine." The burden of proving such a condition
presents a host of troublesome issues for employers, courts, and
the medical community.'0' For instance, employers and courts
might require certification that the smoker has tried, and failed, to
kick the habit through an accredited cessation program.0" Doc-
tors would be asked to certify the addiction without treating it,
despite knowing that effective treatments are readily available.
Studies show that the vast majority of smokers want to quit,0 3
yet a requirement of certification might create a disincentive to do
so if it meant losing special status under the Act.
Under the statutory definition, a disability is an impairment
that "substantially limit[s] one or more of the major life activi-
ties."' Major life activities include "caring for one's self, per-
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 333.
97. Id. at 333-34.
98. Id. at 333.
99. In 1988, the Surgeon General's report on the health consequences of smoking
concluded that cigarette smoking and tbbacco use met the Department of Health and
Human Services' criteria for drug dependency. See REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICO-
TINE ADDICTION iv-v, 215 (1988); Lee & D'Alonzo, supra note 37, at 38.
100. Courts defining drug addiction for the purpose of coverage under the Rehabilita-
tion Act have held that the mere use of drugs, as distinguished from addiction, is not
classified as a handicap under § 504. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth..
680 F. Supp. 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
101. For a discussion of addiction as a disability, see Reese J. Henderson Jr., Addic-
tion As Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1991).
102. This certification would be particularly troublesome due to the vast array of tech-
niques that are available to smokers who want to quit. Studies show that desire is a key
component to the success of all these techniques, yet smokers seeking only to be certi-
fied as addicted might not earnestly participate. See Lee & D'Alonzo, supra note 37, at
38-45.
103. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOK-
ING CESSATION xii (1990); supra note 67.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
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forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning and working."" °5 It is unclear exactly what consti-
tutes a substantial limitation under the ADA,05 but this lan-
guage mirrors section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has stated that the
caselaw interpreting section 504 is relevant to construing the paral-
lel provisions of the ADA."E
Courts have struggled to find a definitive test of what consti-
tutes a substantial limitation under section 504. In Jasany v. United
States Postal Service,'08 the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff,
who was cross-eyed, was not substantially limited because the
impairment affected only a narrow range of jobs."0 9 In 1986, the
Fourth Circuit observed that determining who is handicapped
"cannot be accomplished merely through abstract lists and catego-
ries of impairments" but must be examined on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account whether the "particular impairment con-
stitutes for the particular person a significant barrier to employ-
ment. 110
Although smoking has been shown to contribute substantially
to a variety of respiratory and cardiac problems, the addiction
itself does not impair any major life activities as defined by the
ADA."' Even the shortness of breath that smokers generally ex-
perience is not enough to interfere with most activities, including
working. The committee reports on the ADA indicate that courts
should consider whether important life activities "are restricted as
to the conditions, manner or duration under which they can be
performed in comparison to most people."'1 The EEOC regula-
105. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 451.
106. See id. at 334; 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. 3 (1992) (appendix to the regula-
tions implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) (stating that a definition of the term
is not currently possible); see also Henderson, supra note 101, at 718 (pointing out that
courts have struggled with the "substantially limits" requirement in the Rehabilitation
Act).
107. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.1(c)(2) (1993); see also supra note 77.
108. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 1250.
110. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cf. 1986).
111. Smoking-induced respiratory or cardiac diseases clearly would qualify as disabili-
ties under the ADA, but nicotine addiction, in and of itself, would not be a basis for
coverage. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 333-34.
112. Id. at 334.
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tions implemented to enforce the ADA state that "substantially
limits" means
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to
the average person having comparable training, skills and abili-
ties. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working."3
This issue was addressed in Harmer v. Virginia Electric &
Power ,Co.,n 4 one of the first reported cases to construe the
ADA provisions. The court held that the plaintiff's good perfor-
mance appraisals were evidence that his performance of the essen-
tial functions of his job was comparable to that of other em-
ployees, so that his bronchial asthma, although qualifying as a
disability, was not sufficient to entitle him to protection under the
ADA."5 Similarly, millions of smokers function normally in soci-
ety and in the workplace despite their habit, and are not restricted
in their ability to perform a broad range of jobs. Thus, nicotine
addiction should not qualify as a disability under the ADA.
Courts also might exclude smoking from coverage under the
definition of disability because those who smoke generally choose
to do so knowing the risks and problems associated with it."6
The element of choice involved in taking up smoking is significant
because under the Rehabilitation Act some federal courts refused
to classify as handicaps' 7 conditions that are not immutable" 8
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1993); see also E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding that the inability to perform a particular job
does not render a person handicapped and that the perceived handicap must substantially
limit a person's ability to find work in his chosen field).
114. 831 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1993).
115. Id. at 1306.
116. Alcoholism may be considered voluntary as well, although there are a variety of
other factors that also may contribute to one's propensity to become an alcoholic. See
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1988) (describing such other factors); infra
notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
117. "Handicapped" is a term of art in the Rehabilitation Act. The drafters of the
ADA opted to use the term "disabled" instead, in an effort to use "terminology most in
line with the sensibilities of most Americans with disabilities." H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 333.
118. See, e.g., Greene v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(holding that obesity does not qualify as a handicap under Washington's anti-discrimina-
tion statute because it is not immutable, as are "blindness or lameness").
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or are caused by activities that were self-imposed or voluntary.11 9
Courts are likely to extend this reasoning to the ADA.
A disability also is defined in terms of the perceptions of
others. The ADA covers people who may be "regarded as" dis-
abled who actually are not substantially limited in any major life
activities, except by the attitudes of others.120 For example, the
legislative history of the ADA shows that burn victims are fre-
quently viewed as disabled and discriminated against, although
they may not be functionally disabled at all."' Under this test,
such an individual would clearly be covered by the ADA.
The U.S. Supreme Court, construing the Rehabilitation Act,
created the "regarded as" test in School Board v. Arline." In
Arline, the Court stated that because the plaintiff's tuberculosis
was perceived to be contagious she merited protection under the
Rehabilitation Act to prevent "discrimination on the basis of my-
thology."'" The Court reasoned that "[s]uch an impairment
might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but
could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work
as a result of the negative reactions of others to the im-
pairment." 24 The Court emphasized that, although an individual
may not be actually disabled, the negative perceptions and reac-
tions of others may be just as disabling.
Because Congress explicitly incorporated Arline's "regarded
as" test into the definition of disability under the ADA, applica-
tions of this subjective standard under the Rehabilitation Act are
helpful in determining the scope of the meaning of disability under
the ADA."z For example, in Forrisi v. Bowen,126 the Fourth
Circuit held that a utility systems repairer who suffered from acro-
119. See, e.g., Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
The analogy of discrimination against obese people has some utility in this context. For a
more complete discussion of the treatment of obesity under the discrimination laws, see
Robin Chodak, Recent Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 623 (1992).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 335.
121. Id.
122. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
123. Id. at 285.
124. Id. at 283.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (Supp. III 1991); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (stating that interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act should be
responsive to two countervailing considerations: to effectuate the statutory objectives and
to keep the scope of its coverage within manageable bounds).
126. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
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phobia was not handicapped simply because he was unable to
perform a particular job. Rather, he had to show that his per-
ceived impairment foreclosed that entire type of employment.'2 7
By analogy, even if smokers were regarded as unable to perform
extremely strenuous tasks, that perception would not be enough to
bring them under the rubric of the ADA as long as there were
other, less strenuous jobs available within the same type of em-
ployment.
According to the legislative history, this definition of disability
was intended to compensate for society's accumulated myths, fears,
and stereotypes of disabilities .' Although it is difficult to deter-
mine what these are with respect to smokers, the reasons em-
ployers often give for not hiring smokers are generally supported
by a vast array of scientific studies and surveys."29 The Supreme
Court in Arline stated that the "regarded as" test is "carefully
structured to replace such reflexive reactions ... with actions
based on reasoned and medically sound judgments."'30 Conse-
quently, employers who adopt hiring policies that discriminate
against smokers are well advised to articulate their rationales for
these decisions carefully, making it clear that they are not based
on negative attitudes, fears, or stereotypes. Policies based on care-
ful cost-benefit analyses and supported by sound scientific studies
are far more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny under this defini-
tion.
Some commentators argue that smoking is analogous to alco-
holism, which is explicitly covered under the ADA.' Drinking,
like smoking, is a habit that is voluntarily undertaken and addic-
tive.1 12 Beyond that, however, the analogy breaks down. Studies
have shown that a variety of genetic and sociological factors may
127. Id. at 935; see also Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal.
1984); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980).
128. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 452-53.
129. See supra Sections I(A)-(B).
130. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
131. See, e.g., Goh, supra note 73, at 833.
132. Id. This assertion is not without controversy. The debate is nicely illustrated in
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1988), in which the Court discussed the ques-
tion of whether alcoholism was a disease or the result of willful misconduct. For a com-
plete discussion of alcoholism and the ADA, see Wendy K. Voss, Note, Employing the
Alcoholic Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv.
895 (1992).
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contribute to a person's propensity to become an alcoholic; 33 no
such effect has been shown with respect to nicotine addiction.
The effects of these addictions within the workplace are quite
different as well. Drinking alcohol on breaks or during lunch
would be unacceptable if it interfered with the employee's perfor-
mance on the job, and employers are free to prohibit alcoholic
employees from drinking during work hours.M More importantly,
an alcoholic's illness is much more likely to interfere substantially
with his conduct on the job135 and can be dangerous, for exam-
ple, when heavy machinery is involved. Because the pharmacologi-
cal effects of nicotine are not nearly as debilitating as those of
alcohol, smokers often smoke while working. Unlike alcoholism,
however, smoking can pose a significant health threat to other
employees who are merely working in the same airspace. 136 Be-
cause the problems associated with employing smokers and alco-
holics are different, employers must find different approaches for
solving them.
C. Application of the ADA's Defenses
If courts hold that smokers are covered under the ADA,
employers with exclusively nonsmoking hiring policies may still
find protection under the defenses provided in Title I of the
ADA. There are two important defenses to discriminatory practic-
es under the Act. First, the employer may forego the accommoda-
tion if it places an "undue hardship" on the company. 37 The
availability of this defense depends on factors such as the size,
financial resources, and operation of the business, as well as the
nature and cost of the accommodation. 38 In some cases, the
plaintiff may overcome this defense by showing that funding is
available from federal, state, or private sources.139
133. See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 562-64 (citing studies on the genetic and cultural causes
of alcoholism).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (Supp. III 1991).
135. The ADA does allow employers to prohibit on-the-job use of alcohol and to
hold alcoholics to the same performance standards as other employees. See 42 U.S.C. §
12114(c) (Supp. III 1991).
136. See supra notes 37-40 and aiccompanying text.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
138. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 457.
139. See Stine, supra note 87, at 105.
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A second defense is available if the employer can show that a
disabled individual poses a direct threat to the health and safety of
other employees.' 40 The ADA defines a "direct threat" as "a sig-
nificant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation.' ' 141 Under the EEOC's
regulations, factors such as the nature and duration of the risk and
the likelihood and imminence of the potential harm are relevant to
the defense.42
In the case of smoking in the workplace, these defenses are
inextricably intertwined because of employers' simultaneous duties
to accommodate an inherently dangerous habit and to protect the
rest of the workforce from the dangers of ETS. Employers are
placed in the unenviable position of having to balance smokers'
interests against those of the rest of the workforce. We now know
that environmental tobacco smoke poses a serious health threat to
all employees,'4 ' and some workers may be hypersensitive to to-
bacco smoke-a disability that itself may require the reasonable
accommodation of a smoke-free working environment.'" For em-
ployers, the costs of accommodating addicted smokers while pre-
serving a safe, smoke-free working environment for other employ-
ees may impose an undue hardship.
1. Reasonable Accommodations for Addicted Smokers. It is
unclear what reasonably accommodating a nicotine addict would
entail. The legislative history of the ADA suggests that the em-
ployer must take steps to ensure that the disabled person will be
able to perform the essential functions of his job.145 This accom-
modation may include job restructuring, part-time or modified
work schedules, or other accommodations, depending on the needs
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. III 1991). For a more complete discussion of this
defense, see Mary A. Sedey, The Threat to Safety Defense Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Its Source, Surrounding Caselaw, and Interpretation, 39 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 96 (1992).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (Supp. III 1991).
142. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (1993).
143. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash.
1982) (holding that an employee who was hypersensitive to tobacco smoke was handi-
capped under the Rehabilitation Act); supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
145. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 339.
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of the employee.146 Employers could conceivably work with
smokers to provide more frequent breaks or an office with a sepa-
rate air recirculation system. Some addicts may be able to use
transdermal nicotine patches or nicotine gum at work. Forcing em-
ployees to leave the building to smoke may be reasonable depend-
ing on the distance and weather conditions they would be obliged
to endure. Thus, the required effort at accommodation will inevita-
bly vary depending on the needs of the addicted smoker and the
financial resources and adaptability of the employer.
2. The Scope of the Undue Hardship and Direct Threat De-
fenses. The ADA provides that an employer does not need to
comply with its provisions if the accommodation presents an undue
hardship.14' The determination of undue hardship is made on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the size and financial re-
sources of the business,48 the type of operations it maintains,
and the nature and cost of the accommodation required. 49 The
burden is on the employer to show that the accommodation pres-
ents an undue hardship, but the employee has an opportunity to
show that his disability may be accommodated in a less burden-
some manner.' Significantly, the regulations emphasize that the
defense is not limited to financial difficulties but also is available if
the accommodation would be "unduly ... extensive, substantial,
or disruptive, or [if it] would fundamentally alter the nature or
operation of the business."''
In the smoking context, the undue hardship defense will be
more readily available to small companies with fewer financial
resources, due to the potential costs of accommodating smokers in
the workforce. Larger corporations may still prevail by claiming
that it would be unduly disruptive to build separate facilities for
smokers or to allow them to take more breaks. The defense is
also available if the employer can show that accommodating the
smoker would be detrimental to the ability of other employees to
146. Id.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991).
148. This determination will take into account the number of employees, the number,
size, and location of facilities, and the financial resources of the business. See H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 349.
149. ld.
150. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1993).
151. Id. § 1630.2(p) (app.) (citation omitted).
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perform their duties or to the company's ability to conduct busi-
ness.
152
The direct threat defense likely will be available when em-
ployees are working with substances that work synergistically with
tobacco smoke.53 Whether the dangers of ETS to other employ-
ees are sufficient to support this defense is not clear because these
dangers can be eliminated through accommodations that may be
escapable under the undue hardship defense.
III. CONCLUSION
To include nicotine addicts among the ranks of the disabled
would lead to a variety of unpleasant policy implications. Although
it is unclear how many of America's 48.5 million smokers could
qualify as addicted," 4 including them as a protected class could
vastly increase the number of claims filed with the EEOC, which
is statutorily required to review all claims.' This potential
growth in the number of filings could exacerbate the EEOC's
backlog to such an extent that other Americans with more severe
disabilities would face long delays in the processing of their claims.
Employers who want to implement workplace smoking restric-
tions for the protection of nonsmoking workers may find the fi-
nancial and administrative burdens of accommodating protected
smokers and defending potential lawsuits too excessive to warrant
any new policy. In addition, there are a variety of government and
public grants available to employers who hire individuals with
disabilities to help them pay for necessary accommodations. Defin-
ing smokers as disabled might mean that these funds could be
accessed by them, leaving fewer resources to purchase aids for
other disabled individuals, such as telephone amplifiers for the
hearing impaired or adaptive computer software for the blind.
Even the addicted smoker should not be considered to be in
the same category as a permanently physically disabled individual.
Unlike blindness, multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy, and other per-
manent disabilities, the smoker can, with effort, overcome his
disability. There are numerous programs and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts available to help smokers quit for a relatively small cost com-
152. See id.; Stine, supra note 87, at 104.
153. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 100-36 and accompanying text.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. III 1991).
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pared to the future health costs they are likely to incur. It would
be manifestly unjust for the millions of smokers in America to
usurp valuable employer and government resources that could be
used to give an otherwise unemployable disabled person a job. On
the other hand, allowing employers to discriminate against smokers
in hiring decisions would create a clear and immediate inducement
for them to seek help on their own. This approach would allow
market forces to eventually solve the problem without any govern-
ment intervention. Unlike individuals who have been permanently
disabled by accidents, diseases, or birth defects, smokers retain the
ability to seek help and overcome their habit.
The Americans with Disabilities Act is a promising means for
millions of disabled Americans to overcome the barriers that soci-
ety has placed before them. Meanwhile, smoking causes more
premature deaths than cocaine, heroine, alcohol, fire, automobile
accidents, homicide, and suicide combined.'56 It would be truly
unfortunate if a landmark statute, passed to remedy discrimination
against millions of capable disabled people, were distorted to slow
progress toward the elimination of this dangerous and expensive
habit from the American workplace.
156. SMOKING AND HEALTH, supra note 1, at 8.
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